by m. f.odd He(ldi3rEiOf1

2

THE

UNIVERSITY

OF

CHICAGO

LAW

SCHOOL

•

FALL

2007

he conventional wisdom about executive

T

compensation

for short

periods

is that CEOs

are

these

paid too much.

With the average CEO of a large public firm
making over $7 million per year, and with some
"superstar" CEOs making many times that amount, often
in times of weak

or

performance,

installed

by the CEO

in

most cases,

in

general,

this suggests that compensation contracts are
at the very least, that
increasing the power

efficient. And

of shareholders
is

it is

accept the daim as an obvious facto The daim seems
easy
to be supported by the nature of the pay-setting process.
to

The board that decides how much

where so-called agency costs between owners
and managers are reduced, look similar to these of firms
cases,

unlikely to

forms

be

some

background

....

EHe(!u1.ue

pay. The argument is captured by a recent media account
of the pay issue: "Executive compensation is thc cancer of

corporate America. CEO's have too much power and it
has been directed at their own enrichment.'"
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a

this

account

has surface

appeal,

withstand close scrutiny. Despite
growing

it fails

to

to

high
highly

amounts, the evidence suggests that CEO
pay is

correlated with shareholder

performance,

and is

set

in

returns, is sensitive to

an

We

own

can test

the

in which

a

firm

efficiency of CEO

few

pay by looking at
sophisticated investors, betting their

replace the diffuse shareholders and the
potentially corrupted board and write new executive
money,

compensation

contracts

efficiency argument: CEOs are paid inefficiently
and pay is not linked dosely with firm performance. Let
us look at each in turn.
Paid too much. The

criticism of pay compares
of
an
earnings
average worker and
that the ratio increased to 300 to 1 last year

CEOs, noting

most common

I

compared with a ratio

of 42

1 in 1982. There

to

are

many

oddities about this argument. For one, how are we as
society to determine what the correct ratio should be
any

42

point

to

1

a

in time? Is 300

to

1

a

bad

number?

good

Why not
right question

words, the

are

or

ineíficient ratio? Is

lOto 1
to

a

at

be

or even

asking

is

1

to

not

I?

what

the benefits of various ratios

compared with the costs? Moreover, we don't know whether
a
growing gap is a good or bad thing from a societal
welfare point 'of view, after aU, a growing gap may show
increasing returns to education and hard work, something
that might be expected and a net benefit for society, since
it encourages investments in these things.
Since there is

no

easy

answer

the

ratio, and since the

question

about the

is, in anyevent,
socially optimal
to be different for different firms in different industries
likely
at

different times, the

speciíically

for

state

how much CEOs

answer

question for society, and, more
governing firms, should not be

law

are

paid,

but who decides how much

they
paid. After all, if the process for setting pay
is free from corruption and represents a market-based
should be

with the CEO. If contracts in

FALL

an

the ratio between the

efficient labor market. The

evidence also shows that CEO
pay is not as a result of a corrupt
process whereby the CEO
effectively writes herself a check.
cases

second is

is the ratio, but what

dollar

'1'1

There are two distinct arguments in the modern criticism
of executive pay. The first is a populist argument: CEOs
are
paid too much compared with the average worker. The

In other
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group, given their small stakes in the firm, not to mention
that CEOs camouflage the true nature and amounts of

year

we
get to this research,
the debate.

on

to

personal influence. Ir is provided with most of its information
by the CEO or consultants chosen by her, and importantly,
is paying the CEO with other peoples' money.
Critics of high pay argue that these other people, generally
the shareholders, are powerless to constrain CEO's salaries
because they are a diffuse and rationally disinterested
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But before

or amounts.

require

pay the executive is
and is under the CEO's

compensation decisions
produce much change in compensation
intervene in

to
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wage, it is hard to argue that the amounts are grossly
inefficient or wrong in some way. This is a subject we will
return to

in

The ratio

bear

creating

a moment.

problem is,

some

be related

of course,

not

unique

to

relation

the difficult of their

to

size and

to

cornplexity,

shareholder value. One

the ratio of total executive

CEOs.

The data show that top
artists, movie stars, and

value

that do work behind the

of the firms that CEOs

good.

Returns

scenes to

make these

stars

talent have increased

or

today is

job,

their

of this is

test

compensation

much les s than it

and is about the

to

which may
success

in

to

compare
firm market

was

from 1940

1960,

to

the average over the period from
to
the
This
1960
present.
suggests that the ratio is not out
of whack, but merely reflects changes inherent in the size

look

dramatically
perhaps because improvements in technology
globalization of markets allow individuals to
to

to

total firm sales. Recent research shows that this

lawyers, football players, recording
celebrity journalists have all seen
their wages rise dramatically in the past few decades,
especially when compared with the paralegals, equipment
managers, sound engineers, camera operators, and interns

ratio

and

same as

happen

to run.

across

the board,
and the

thcir talent

Ptrgurnen1s abDU1

exploit
greater and greater asset base
with little additional cost. While this is an interesting
over a

CEDs ShDU�d ba
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study, it has little to do
with the current executive compensation debate. We don't
see critics
lamenting the rising ratio of the wages ofTom
Cruise to his make-up artist or Alex Rodriquez to the hitting

phenomenon that

deserves greater

coach for the Yankees, and this should tell

American businesses

George
play third base for the Yankees. Again,
we'll come back to this shordy.
Finally, the pay-ratio argument ignores the fact that
American businesses look very different today than they
did in 1982. Most obviously, the average CEO tenure in
1982 was over 10 years, while today it is about 4 years and
falling. After accounting for this drop, which, by the way,
sure doesn't sound like CEOs are
getting more powerful,
the growth in to tal expected CEO pay is far less dramatic,
to

managed firms

averse,

could demand
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salary and to

increase their

prestige.

mid-1980s, firms started paying CEOs
shares of the company stock in
now had incentives to maximize

period, thc growth in CEO compensation
entirely explained by this equity component.
(The growth in cash compensation has been les s than
5 percent per year over the past 20 years, compared with a
constant
growth rate of over 50 percent per year for equity
compensation). In other words, CEOs are rich today
because they have presided over firms that have made

are, on

might

greater

giving them

has been almost

were

utility

owners

the form of options. CEOs

number of shareholder lawsuits. CEO pay has risen in part
because it is much riskier to be a CEO these days.

4

a

in the

like -owners,

potential personalliability Of even
the result of Sarbanes-Oxley and a growing

addition, American firms

own

example, managers had incentives to be risk
lest they be fired, and to build ernpires, so they

profit.

In

in ways that maximized their

the firmo For

under securities laws and

than

more

rather than that of their masters, the shareholder

amounting less than 5 percent per year. In addition, CEOs
have faced increased risks in the form of increased disdosure
as

are

from shareholder returns, the evidence shows that CEOs

to

time

also much

profitable and
valuable than they were in 1982. The growth in CEO pay
is almost entirely explained by the fact that CEOs are paid
primarily with equity, and as firm size value has grown, so
has pay. (Ir is worth noting that in many countries CEOs
were
historically paid with cash instead of equity-stock
options were illegal in Germany until very recendy-and
this helps explain in large part international pay gaps). In
1982, to use that magical year when CEOs andworkers
were
paid at a reasonable ratio, the average CEO was paid
like a bureaucrat, receiving a salary and a bonus that was
tied to some measure of performance, typically revenue
growth. Because pay was modest and was largely de-linked

us

he demands hundreds of millions of dollars from

prison

1D hDW

paid lead
CEDs are paid

and umn dacides hrJW much.

something
about the real issue in the CEO debate-it is about political
power in corporate America, not about populist criticism
of some people who happened to make ir rich. The CEO
pay issue has political salience in part because of who
the CEOs are and in part because they are earning the
money that might arguably belong to others, be they
providers of labor or capital. This is why the "Say on Pay"
bill designed to give shareholders a voice over compensation
has political constituen'ts-the argument is that CEOs are
stealing from shareholders in a way that A-Rod isn't when
Steinbrenner

hDW much
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shareholders rich too. In fact, comparing median to tal
return to shareholders (price appreciation plus dividends)
and CEO pay over the past 10 years shows that they move
in unisono This can also be seen by overlaying the growth
in CEO pay since the 1980s
capitalization of u.s. equity
move

together

over a curve

of market

markets; again, the curves
lockstep (both up and down) precisely

in

because CEO pay is

so

sensitive

to

firm market

performance

(Figure 1). (An important footnore here is that paying with
executives incentives

stock

manipulate
options gaye
prices for personal benefit. There are, of course, downsides
to every form of compensation, and the question should not
some

be whether

some

executives

to

misbehaved, but whether the

equity pay exceed the costs.)
The fact that shareholder wealth has increased

net

benefits from

not

this

the end of the argument. Ir

of whether CEOs

are

same: the board, on advice from
compensation
consultants, decides how much to pay the CEO, who,
although technically employed by the board, has tremendous

power over them. This circularity of power leads compensation
critics like Lucian Bebchuk of the Harvard Law School to
argue that CEO pay is not based on performance, but
instead is based on managerial power. He and co-author
Jesse Fried wrote an entire book on this subject, premised
on

the

assumption that "[f]lawed compensation arrangements
widespread, persistent, and systemic, and they

have been

ílle dnn "1

a

see

critics

'arnen1.ng

ratin [Jf tha wages [Jf
Tnm Cru.se 1[J his maka-up artist
tha

over

merely begs the
disproportionate
taking
question
share of gains, either because they are being compensated
for things beyond their control (e.g., the market or firm
value would have gone up anyway) or because they misuse
their power over the pay-setting process to reward
themselves-taking what economists call "rents" -at the

period is

firms is the

[Jr

r.s.ng

fUeH

A[Jdr.quea

1[J 1he

hUUng

cnach Inr 1he 'rankees.
have stemmed from defects in the
structure

that enable executives

to

underlying governance
exercise considerable

inefficiency view is shared
wrote recently
by
leads us inexorably to a discussion of the efficiency of the
that "excessive compensation
packages are a consequence
victim
to
a seduction
of
and
the
boards
by the CEO and the
compensation setting process
falling
compensation
in
to
create
boarď
that
If
is
solution
result
from
it.
these
are
there
efficient,
is,
bargains
independence."
part,
greater
not much more, short of
The managerial power view asserts that executive
legislating CEO pay amounts,
that we as society can do about it.
compensation contracts made through the typical board
ln efficiently paid.
how
CEOs
about
much
process are decidedly not negotiated at arrn's length. The
Arguments
should be paid lead inevitably to how CEOs are paid and
specific factors limiting the ability of boards to do so are:
who decides how much. The
for
most
(1) the power of the CEO over the appointment of
pay-setting process
r---------------------------------.
directors; (2) the ability of the
Figure 1
CEO to reward cooperative
iníluence

expense of their shareholder masters. This, like the
question-begging out-of-whack-ratio problem above,

over

their boards.'? This

former SEC Chair Arthur Levitt, who
...

$15

,...---------------------------.

12,000

directors; (3) the social and

psychological
CEO has

over

iníluences the

directors, such

the power of friendship,
loyalty, collegiality, and
as

authority; (4)

the

cognitive

biases of directors that

from

being CEOs

or

come

former

CEOs themselves; and

(5) the

time and informational barriers
most

1970
Source: Kevin

1975

1990

1995

2000

an

2005

directors face

to

making

informed and reasoned

decision about pay.
Bebchuk and Fried also argue

Murphy (2007)
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that certain methods of compensation, such

(non-indexed, at-the-money) stock options

as

traditional

market almost 30 percent over the past three years. Also,
as noted above, CEO tenure has fallen
by half over the

suboptimal
efficiency perspective. The argument is that
traditional options do not provide as much incentive bang
for the buck as indexed options with a strike price above
the current market price. For example, if an oil firm grant s
the CEO 100,000 non-indexed, at-the-rnoney options on
January 1, and on July 1 the price of oil increases (because
of, say, a crisis in the Middle East), caus ing the firm's stock
price to rise $10 per share, the CEO will earn $1 million
largely thanks to events outside of his control. In addition,
from

are

past decade, which casts some serious doubt on the FuU
Monty version of the managerial power theory.

an

A second bit of research looks instead

process in

reduced

11 of the

an

incentive

increase share value above

to

link

to see

on

how

I looked

are

were

halí

by

past decada, Wh.Lh

suma

aeriaus dnutn

whether pay

practices,

say the

use

on

of nonindexed

investors

options, changed
sophisticated
charge of writing compensation contracts."
The primary effect of bankruptcy is to wipe
once

the claim that pay is de-linked from

were

out

in

the

claims of the distant, diffuse, and disinterested shareholders,
the

ones

that

managers

the Graduate School of Business, shows that pay and
performance are actually tightly linked: top decile firms

to

managerial power theorists

get away with

rent

only sophisticated
companies, hedge funds,

claim allow

extraction, and

investors, such

at

as

banks,

to

leave

insurance

specialty bondholders
known as "vulture investors". These investors are specialist,
repeat players in workouts or distressed investing. They
achieve control either by buying significant blocks of a
íirm's outstanding debt or by agreeing to loan the debtor
additional funds, subject to restrictive debt covenants that

(in pay) outperflrm their industries by over 60 percent,
while the bottom decile firms (in pay) underperjorm their
industries by about 20 percent.' This comports with the

consistently

managerial power is

the reduction has

mon1y varsinn of 1hE
rnanagEf.a� pOWEf 1hEOfy.

performance is to look at the data. Recent work by Steve
Kaplan and Joshua Rauh, my colleagues across the Midway

and fallen

pay-setting

1he FuU

a

to

managerial power,"

evidence discussed above,

tne

casts

and yet not used by firms, it is believed that the "design
of option programs is consistent with the presence of
to

the

at about 80 firms
paid.
reorganized under Chapter
Bankruptcy Code or worked out debt privately

ovar

compensation
firm-specific performance by comparing the firm's
performance with an index of other firms in that industry.
Because this compensation design is rather straightforward

A first response

impact

at

more

to

level) and

where

CED tenura has Iallan

efficient, the argument
the strike price above the market price (to give

certain threshold

what

in financial distress that

this firm get nothing from this payment that they could
not have received from
holding a diversified basket of oil
goes, to set
the executive

special

to see

case

and how much CEOs

because the shares of alloil firms will rise, shareholders in

firm securities. Ir would be

a

showing that

CEO pay has risen
with the stock market. For example,

average real CEO pay reached its peak at the height of the
stock market in 2000, and has faUen along with the stock

and

grant the lender contractual control of many of the firm's
activities. In most cases, the holders ofbank debt consolidate

their interests in and around financial distress

by creating a
single credit facility that reorders thc existing debt of many
providers and pumps new cash into the debtor. A similar
consolidation happens with the bond debt, which vulture
investors buy up in order to secure a blocking position in
the

process. The end result is that these 80
other bankruptcies, the thousands of

reorganization

cases,

like

most

replaced with a few, highly sophisticated
betting huge amounts of money on turning the
firm from distress to profitability.
CEO power over pay is greatly reduced in these cases.
For one, existing CEO compensation contracts were ripped
shareholders
investors
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